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BOOK REVIEW 
FEAR OF DEMOCRACY: A CULTURAL EVALUATION OF 
SUNSTEIN ON RISK 
LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE.  By 
Cass R. Sunstein.  Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.  2005.  
Pp. xii, 234.  $23.99. 
Reviewed by Dan M. Kahan,∗ Paul Slovic,∗∗ 
Donald Braman,∗∗∗ and John Gastil∗∗∗∗ 
To secure the public good . . . and at the same time to preserve the spirit 
and the form of popular government, is then the great object to which our 
inquiries are directed. 
  — James Madison1 
[T]he only thing we have to fear is fear itself . . . . 
 — Franklin D. Roosevelt2 
The effective regulation of risk poses a singular challenge to de-
mocracy.  The public welfare of democratic societies depends on their 
capacity to abate all manner of natural and man-made hazards — 
from environmental catastrophe and economic collapse to domestic 
terrorism and the outbreak of disease.  But the need to form rational 
responses to these and other dangers also challenges democratic socie-
ties in a more fundamental way: by threatening their commitment to 
genuinely deliberative policymaking.  Effective risk regulation depends 
on highly technical forms of scientific information — epidemiological, 
toxicological, economic, and the like.  Most citizens don’t even have 
access to such information, much less the inclination and capacity to 
make sense of it.  Why, then, should regulatory law afford any weight 
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 1 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 80 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 2 Franklin D. Roosevelt, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1933), in 2 THE PUBLIC PAPERS 
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1072 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 119:1071  
to the uneducated opinions of ordinary citizens as opposed to the rea-
soned judgments of politically insulated risk experts? 
It is the urgency of this question that makes the study of risk per-
ception a policy science of the first order.  Employing a diverse array 
of methods from the social sciences, the field of risk perception seeks to 
comprehend the diverse processes by which individuals form beliefs 
about the seriousness of various hazards and the efficacy of measures 
designed to mitigate them.  Risk perception scholars are not of one 
mind about the prospects for making public opinion conform to the 
best available scientific information on risk.  But no one who aspires 
to devise procedures that make democratic policymaking responsive to 
such information can hope to succeed without availing herself of the 
insights this field has to offer. 
Cass Sunstein’s Laws of Fear: Beyond the Precautionary Principle 
is a major contribution to the field of risk perception written in pre-
cisely this spirit.  In Sunstein’s view, the major thing proponents of 
democratically grounded risk regulation have to fear, in essence, is fear 
itself.  Adroitly synthesizing a vast body of empirical literature, Sun-
stein catalogues the numerous social and cognitive mechanisms that 
drive members of the public to form wildly overstated estimates of 
various societal dangers.  He also proposes a number of important in-
stitutional devices designed to shield “deliberative democracy” from 
the pernicious influence of these “[r]isk panics” (p. 1).  They include, 
principally, a form of expert cost-benefit analysis that would separate 
out considered public values from irrational public fears and a set of 
administrative procedures that would make law responsive to the for-
mer and impervious to the latter.  Few recent works in the field of risk 
perception rival Sunstein’s in breadth, intelligence, and relevance. 
But as masterful as Sunstein’s account is, its persuasiveness is un-
dercut by Sunstein’s inattention to one of the most important recent 
advances in the science of risk perception.  A growing body of work 
suggests that cultural worldviews permeate all of the mechanisms 
through which individuals apprehend risk, including their emotional 
appraisals of putatively dangerous activities, their comprehension and 
retention of empirical information, and their disposition to trust com-
peting sources of risk information.  As a result, individuals effectively 
conform their beliefs about risk to their visions of an ideal society.  
This phenomenon — which we propose to call “cultural cognition” — 
not only helps explain why members of the public so often disagree 
with experts about matters as diverse as global warming, gun control, 
the spread of HIV through casual contact, and the health conse-
quences of obtaining an abortion; it also explains why experts them-
selves so often disagree about these matters and why political conflict 
over them is so intense. 
The phenomenon of cultural cognition underwrites a strong cri-
tique of the analysis that Sunstein presents in Laws of Fear.  Once the 
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influence of culture is taken into account, what Sunstein sees as public 
hysteria is often revealed to be a complex form of status competition 
between the adherents of competing cultural visions.  This reformula-
tion of public risk sensibilities, in turn, undermines much of Sunstein’s 
normative account of how the law should respond to public risk per-
ceptions.  Because citizens’ fears express their cultural visions of how 
society should be organized, the line between “considered values” and 
“irrational fears” often proves illusory.  Reliance on expert cost-benefit 
analysis, in these circumstances, becomes less a strategy for rationally 
implementing public values than a device for strategically avoiding po-
litical disputes over individual virtue and collective justice. 
Unfortunately, though, it’s not clear that incorporating cultural 
cognition into the science of risk perception reduces the complexity of 
reconciling rational risk regulation with democratic decisionmaking.  A 
theory of risk perception that incorporates cultural cognition is teem-
ing with insights on how to structure risk communication; by linking 
risk perception to cultural values, it identifies myriad new strategies 
for managing public impressions of what risks are real and what risk-
mitigation strategies are effective.  But at the same time that such a 
theory makes the prescriptive dimension of risk regulation more trac-
table, it makes the normative dimension considerably harder to assess.  
If risk disputes are really disputes over the good life, then the chal-
lenge that risk regulation poses for democracy is less how to reconcile 
public sensibilities with science than how to accommodate diverse vi-
sions of the good within a popular system of regulation.  Fear itself 
may indeed be what democratic societies, or at least pluralistic ones, 
most have to fear — not because governmental responses to risk are 
likely to be irrational, but because risk regulation is inherently fraught 
with the potential for illiberality. 
We develop this response to Sunstein’s Laws of Fear in four Parts.  
In Part I, we explicate Sunstein’s account.  Sunstein’s theory is best 
understood within the context of a debate over two competing models 
of risk perception — one that sees individuals as rational weighers of 
risk and another that sees them as irrational weighers. 
In Part II, we examine the dynamic that Sunstein’s account over-
looks: cultural cognition.  We show how cultural cognition supports a 
distinct model of risk perception — one in which individuals behave 
neither as rational nor irrational weighers but rather as cultural 
evaluators of risk.  In Part III, we use this model to challenge the  
central positive, normative, and prescriptive components of Sunstein’s  
account. 
Finally, in Part IV, we examine what the cultural-evaluator model 
of risk perception reveals about the tension between risk regulation 
and liberalism.  Surprisingly, one response to this tension might be to 
base policymaking on an irrational-weigher theory such as Sunstein’s, 
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precisely because that model overlooks the cultural underpinnings of 
public risk perceptions. 
I.  SUNSTEIN AND THE “IRRATIONAL-WEIGHER” MODEL 
Advances in the field of risk perception have been fueled by an en-
ergetic debate between the proponents of two opposing theories.  
These theories, which we will call the “rational-weigher” and “irra-
tional-weigher” models, posit competing accounts of the nature of in-
dividual judgments of risk and how the law should respond to them.  
Sunstein’s account is most readily understood within the context of 
this debate.  Thus, we begin with a general overview of the points of 
contention between the rational-weigher and irrational-weigher models 
and then turn to the particulars of Sunstein’s sophisticated articulation 
of the latter. 
A.  Two Conceptions of Individual Risk Perception:  
Rational Versus Irrational Weighing 
Grounded in the assumptions and methods of neoclassical econom-
ics, the rational-weigher model asserts that individuals, in aggregate 
and over time, form judgments toward risk that maximize expected 
utility.  Decisions to take a hazardous job (say, as a construction 
worker),3 to purchase a potentially dangerous consumer good (perhaps 
a chainsaw),4 or even to engage in manifestly unhealthy forms of per-
sonal recreation (smoking cigarettes5 or unsafe sex6) — all ultimately 
embody a considered balancing of costs and benefits. 
To be sure, people suffer from imperfect information, make mis-
takes, and even lack the capacity to follow through on what they cor-
rectly perceive to be in their best interests.  But as a result of chance 
variation and market-based forms of social selection, whatever depar-
tures from utility maximization these impairments might induce in 
particular individuals can be expected to cancel each other out across 
individuals.  Accordingly, even if no individual approaches risk in a 
perfectly rational fashion, people behave as if they were doing so in 
aggregate.7 
The rational-weigher model counsels a restrained role for govern-
mental risk regulation.  If people left to their own devices generally 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 3 See, e.g., W. KIP VISCUSI, RISK BY CHOICE: REGULATING HEALTH AND SAFETY IN 
THE WORKPLACE 37 (1983). 
 4 See, e.g., Alan Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 
97 YALE L.J. 353, 358 (1988). 
 5 See, e.g., W. KIP VISCUSI, SMOKING: MAKING THE RISKY DECISION (1992). 
 6 See, e.g., TOMAS J. PHILIPSON & RICHARD A. POSNER, PRIVATE CHOICES AND PUB-
LIC HEALTH: THE AIDS EPIDEMIC IN AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 57–83 (1993). 
 7 See, e.g., VISCUSI, supra note 3, at 4; Schwartz, supra note 4, at 374–84. 
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make choices that maximize their well-being, then devising legal re-
gimes and institutions to regulate risk-taking is largely unnecessary 
and indeed ultimately destructive of societal wealth and individual 
freedom.8  The only circumstance in which regulatory intervention is 
clearly warranted is when utility-maximizing individuals are likely to 
expose others to risks the expected costs of which are not fully borne 
by those creating them.  But when imposing regulation to combat ex-
ternalities of this sort, regulators should not, according to proponents 
of the rational-weigher model, be guided by their own personal judg-
ments of what types of risk-taking are socially desirable.  Rather they 
should try to base regulatory standards on the preferences implicit in 
the behavior of persons who do fully internalize both the costs and 
benefits of putatively dangerous activities.  In effect, regulatory re-
sponses to risk should mimic the individual responses revealed in mar-
kets and related forms of collective behavior.9 
The irrational-weigher model, in contrast, posits that people, con-
sidered individually or collectively, approach matters of risk in a man-
ner that systematically fails to maximize their utility.  Drawing on so-
cial psychology and behavioral economics, the proponents of this 
position have catalogued a vast array of cognitive limitations and de-
fects that distort popular perceptions of risk.10  Thus, individuals are 
disposed to wildly overestimate the magnitude of highly evocative 
risks (say, of a nuclear power accident) and to ignore less evocative 
ones (say, of developing cancer from peanut butter).11  Far from cancel-
ing each other out, the types of risk-estimation errors that people make 
on an individual level tend to become even more exaggerated as indi-
viduals interact with one another.  Various mechanisms of social influ-
ence cause popular risk perceptions to reinforce and feed on them-
selves, generating waves of mass incomprehension.12 
The irrational-weigher model counsels a much more aggressive 
program of governmental regulation.  The cognitive defects and social 
forces that tend to distort risk perceptions have the largest impact on 
members of the lay public; scientifically trained experts are less vul-
nerable to these influences because they routinely access and compre-
hend accurate sources of information, form more balanced mental  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 8 See, e.g., VISCUSI, supra note 3, at 4; Schwartz, supra note 4, at 383. 
 9 See, e.g., VISCUSI, supra note 3, at 114–35.  
 10 See, e.g., PAUL SLOVIC, THE PERCEPTION OF RISK 1–50 (2000); Roger G. Noll & James 
E. Krier, Some Implications of Cognitive Psychology for Risk Regulation, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 747 
(1990). 
 11 See, e.g., Roger E. Kasperson, Ortwin Renn, Paul Slovic, Halina S. Brown, Jacque Emel, 
Robert Goble, Jeanne X. Kasperson & Samuel Ratick, The Social Amplification of Risk: A Con-
ceptual Framework, 8 RISK ANALYSIS 177, 178 (1988); see also SLOVIC, supra note 10, at 37–38; 
Noll & Krier, supra note 10, at 754–55.  
 12 See, e.g., Kasperson et al., supra note 11, at 179–86.  
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inventories of the harms and benefits associated with various puta-
tively dangerous behaviors, and converge on consensus judgments 
through rigorous exchanges with other, similarly well-informed observ-
ers.13  It thus makes sense to entrust matters of environmental regula-
tion, consumer protection, workplace safety, and the like to such ex-
perts, who should be insulated as much as possible from politics to 
avoid the distorting influence of the public’s misapprehension of risk.14 
We have sketched out the rational-weigher and irrational-weigher 
models in their purest forms.  It’s possible, of course, to formulate in-
termediate positions that include elements of both.15  Even more im-
portant, it’s possible to qualify either model based on considerations 
external to both.  Some exponents of the irrational-weigher model, for 
example, are careful to distinguish divergences between lay and expert 
risk assessments that reflect the bounded rationality of the public from 
those that reflect “rival rationalities”: one, on the part of experts, that 
reduces all issues of risk to a unitary expected-utility metric; and an-
other, on the part of the public, that includes qualitative elements of 
appraisal that defy such a metric.16  But the pure forms of the ra-
tional-weigher and irrational-weigher models are well represented in 
the study of risk perception and furnish useful reference points for 
making sense of any particular scholar’s position. 
B.  Sunstein on Risk 
Sunstein’s position, as reflected in Laws of Fear, embodies the 
premises of the irrational-weigher model in an essentially unqualified 
form.  Indeed, based on his systematic description of the dynamics that 
drive public risk perceptions and his detailed prescriptions for shield-
ing risk regulation from the distorting influence of these forces, Sun-
stein’s theory can be viewed as the most instructive account to date of 
what the irrational-weigher model entails for law. 
1.  Descriptive. — Sunstein’s conception of the irrational-weigher 
model of risk perception contains two components.  The first com-
prises the psychological mechanisms that dispose individuals to sys-
tematically misestimate risk.  The second highlights the social forces 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 13 See HOWARD MARGOLIS, DEALING WITH RISK: WHY THE PUBLIC AND THE 
EXPERTS DISAGREE ON ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES 71–97 (1996). 
 14 For an influential statement of this view, see STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE 
VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION (1993). 
 15 One might characterize Kip Viscusi’s more recent work, which treats market and other pri-
vate behavior toward risk-taking as rational and political responses as irrational, in this way.  See, 
e.g., W. KIP VISCUSI, RATIONAL RISK POLICY (1998). 
 16 See SLOVIC, supra note 10, at 137–53, 285–315.  For an innovative attempt to build qualita-
tive evaluations of risk into a framework of cost-benefit analysis that minimizes the distorting in-
fluence of various cognitive biases, see Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Cost-
Benefit Analysis, and the Discounting of Human Lives, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 941 (1999). 
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that magnify popular assessments of risk as individuals interact with 
one another. 
Among the former is the “availability heuristic.”  This dynamic re-
fers to the tendency of individuals to “assess the magnitude of risks” 
based on how “easily [they can] think of . . . examples” of the misfor-
tunes to which these risks give rise (p. 36).17  Thus, nuclear power 
triggers alarm because of the notoriety of the accidents at Three Mile 
Island and Chernobyl; the hazards of toxic waste disposal assume 
massive proportions because of the publicity that surrounded the Love 
Canal affair; arsenic levels in drinking water generate apprehension 
because “arsenic is [a] well known . . . poison,” in part due to the “clas-
sic movie about poisoning, Arsenic and Old Lace” (pp. 37–38).  The in-
fluence of the availability heuristic can easily distort public judgment, 
insofar as calamitous misfortunes, however isolated, are much more 
likely to grab media attention and stick in the public memory than are 
the myriad instances in which risky technologies, processes, or chemi-
cals generate benefits for society.18 
Another mechanism that distorts public risk perceptions is “prob-
ability neglect.”  This is Sunstein’s term for characterizing an asserted 
disposition of persons “to focus on the worst case, even if it is highly 
improbable” (p. 35).  To maximize expected utility, individuals ought to 
discount the gain or loss associated with a course of action by the 
probability that such an outcome will occur.19  Experimental research 
shows, however, that individuals are less likely to discount in this fash-
ion when they are evaluating outcomes that provoke strongly negative 
emotions such as fear; the cost individuals are willing to incur to avoid 
such outcomes is relatively insensitive to the diminishing probability 
that such outcomes will occur.20  For Sunstein, this finding implies that 
ordinary citizens are likely to support expensive preventative meas-
ures, however remote the risks and however cost-ineffective the 
abatement procedures.  Examples, he argues, include massive invest-
ments in toxic waste cleanup and cumbersome procedures for screen-
ing mail for anthrax (pp. 83–85). 
Additional related mechanisms converge to make individuals un-
duly insensitive to the benefits of risky technologies.  One of these 
mechanisms is “loss aversion.”  Typically, “a loss from the status quo is  
 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 17 See generally SLOVIC, supra note 10, at 37–38. 
 18 Cf. MARGOLIS, supra note 13, at 94–97. 
 19 See generally DAVID SKLANSKY, THE THEORY OF POKER 9–11 (4th ed. 1999). 
 20 See Yuval Rottenstreich & Christopher K. Hsee, Money, Kisses, and Electric Shocks: On 
the Affective Psychology of Risk, 12 PSYCHOL. SCI. 185 (2001).   
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seen as more undesirable than a gain is seen as desirable” (p. 41).21  
Another is the “endowment effect.”  Individuals value goods more once 
they have them than they did before they acquired them;22 as a result, 
they are likely to resist courses of action that require them to risk 
goods they have to achieve outcomes they would value even more (p. 
42).  Individuals also display a form of “status quo bias”23: in apprais-
ing a potentially beneficial but also risky course of action, they fall 
back on the maxim “[b]etter safe than sorry” to justify inaction (p. 
47).24  In tandem, these dispositions generate a species of conservatism 
that causes individuals to seize on the potential “losses produced by 
any newly introduced risk, or by any aggravation of existing risks,” to 
block new technologies without “concern[] [for] the benefits that are 
forgone as a result” (p. 42).25  This is the explanation, according to 
Sunstein, of why persons are “so concerned about the risks of nuclear 
power” even though “experts tend to believe that the risks are 
. . . lower, in fact, than the risks from competing energy sources, such 
as coal-fired power plants” (p. 47). 
Another distorting mechanism is affect.  The emotional responses 
that putatively dangerous activities trigger in persons have been shown 
to be one of the most robust predictors of how risky they perceive such 
activities to be.26  Indeed, Sunstein plausibly depicts the impact of af-
fect as foundational to nearly all other mechanisms of risk perception.  
The availability of risks is regulated by how emotionally gripping the 
images of misfortune they provoke are (pp. 38–39).  It is “when intense 
emotions are engaged [that] people tend to focus on the adverse out-
come, not on its likelihood” (p. 64).  Persons react conservatively and 
display status quo bias or loss aversion because “[w]hen [they] antici-
pate a loss of what [they] now have, [they] can become genuinely 
afraid, in a way that greatly exceeds [their] feelings of pleasurable an-
ticipation when [they] look forward to some supplement to what [they] 
now have” (p. 41). 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 21 This is an application of Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky’s famous “prospect theory.”  
See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 
ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979). 
 22 See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The En-
dowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 1991, at 193. 
 23 See id.  
 24 The author here quotes MARGOLIS, supra note 13, at 5.  Internal quotation marks have 
been omitted.  See also id. at 74, 165–89. 
 25 Emphasis has been omitted. 
 26 See Melissa L. Finucane, Ali Alhakami, Paul Slovic & Stephen M. Johnson, The Affect Heu-
ristic in Judgments of Risks and Benefits, 13 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 1 (2000); George F. 
Loewenstein, Elke U. Weber, Christopher K. Hsee & Ned Welch, Risk as Feelings, 127 PSYCHOL. 
BULL. 267 (2001); Paul Slovic, Melissa L. Finucane, Ellen Peters & Donald G. MacGregor, Risk 
as Analysis and Risk as Feelings: Some Thoughts About Affect, Reason, Risk, and Rationality, 24 
RISK ANALYSIS 311 (2004). 
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The distorting influence that these psychological mechanisms exert 
on individual risk perceptions is magnified, according to Sunstein, by 
two social forces.  Sunstein calls the first of these forces “availability 
cascades.”  For the same reason that “fear-inducing accounts” of mis-
fortune with “high emotional valence” are likely to be noticed and re-
called, they are also likely “to be repeated, leading to cascade effects, 
as the event becomes available to increasingly large numbers of peo-
ple” (p. 96).  “[A] process of this sort,” Sunstein maintains, “played a 
large role in the [reaction to the] Washington area sniper attacks, the 
Love Canal scare, [and] the debate over mad cow disease” (p. 94).  
Availability cascades also help explain “moral panics” in which large 
segments of society suddenly perceive “religious dissidents, foreigners, 
immigrants, homosexuals, teenage gangs, and drug users” as sources of 
danger (p. 98). 
“Group polarization,” the second social force Sunstein discusses, 
magnifies the impact of individual biases when individuals engage in 
deliberations over risks and how to abate them.27  Individuals don’t 
moderate their views when they engage in such discussions, Sunstein 
argues; on the contrary, “they typically end up accepting a more ex-
treme version of the views with which they began” (p. 98).  If one view 
is even slightly predominant within a group when it starts deliberation, 
arguments in favor of that position will predominate in discussions, 
fortifying the confidence of those who hold that position and making a 
bigger impact on the undecided.  This effect will be reinforced by the 
subconscious desire of persons to conform their view to the apparent 
majority and by the reluctance of those who perceive themselves to be 
in the minority to take a public stance that might expose them to  
ridicule. 
Despite his emphasis on “[r]isk panics,” Sunstein recognizes that the 
same dynamics that make persons “fearful when they ought not to be” 
can also make them “fearless when they should be frightened” (p. 1).  
Indeed, one state almost entails the other.  This is the case partly be-
cause so many risks are offsetting.  A society that pays inordinate at-
tention to the risks of nuclear power necessarily pays too little to the 
risks associated with fossil fuels (for example, global warming and acid 
rain) (pp. 27–28).  Many societies that fear the carcinogenic effects of 
the pesticide DDT are insufficiently mindful of the increased incidence 
of malaria associated with using less effective substitutes (p. 32).  
Excessive fear and insufficient fear also tend to mirror each other, 
according to Sunstein, because of the largely hidden — and hence 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 27 See generally Charles G. Lord, Lee Ross & Mark R. Lepper, Biased Assimilation and Atti-
tude Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098 (1979). 
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emotionally tepid — financial impact of risk-reducing regulation.  Sun-
stein cites studies suggesting that every $7 million to $15 million in 
costs incurred to comply with governmental regulation is itself associ-
ated with the expected loss of one human life given the adverse effect 
of such expenditures on the economy (pp. 32–33).28  Accordingly, many 
costly programs that only slightly reduce the magnitude of risks (such 
as the amount of arsenic in drinking water) actually end up costing 
more lives than they save (pp. 28–29).  
It thus becomes impossible (practically and maybe even conceptu-
ally) to say which — excessive fear or excessive fearlessness — domi-
nates in public risk perceptions.  But one conclusion that can be drawn 
from Sunstein’s account is that the public, impelled by emotion and 
waves of hysteria to fixate on some risks and wholly disregard others, 
can never be expected to get it right.  The greatest risk to the public’s 
health may be its own risk assessments. 
2.  Normative and Prescriptive. — Sunstein has just as much to say 
about what the law should do to respond to distorted public percep-
tions of risk as he does about the forces responsible for distorting them.  
Not surprisingly, he unequivocally rejects “populist systems” (p. 1) of 
regulation that take public risk evaluations at face value.  Indeed, one 
of the major objectives of Laws of Fear is to critique the so-called 
“precautionary principle” as unduly responsive to public sentiments.  
That principle, which enjoys worldwide support among environmen-
talists and regulatory authorities (pp. 15–18), asserts, essentially, that 
“when there is scientific uncertainty as to the nature of [the] damage or 
the likelihood of the risk” posed by some activity, “then decisions 
should be made so as to prevent such activit[y] . . . unless and until 
scientific evidence shows that the damage will not occur” (p. 19).29  
When enforced by democratically responsive institutions, this ap-
proach, Sunstein maintains, yokes regulatory law to the various 
mechanisms — availability, probability neglect, status quo bias, and 
various forms of social influence — that make the public irrationally 
fearful of “low-probability risks” (p. 26).  At the same time, because 
fixation on particular risks is always accompanied by inattention to 
offsetting risks and the adverse societal impact of regulatory expendi-
tures, the precautionary principle inevitably forces society to forgo 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 28 The author cites ROBERT W. HAHN, RANDALL W. LUTTER & W. KIP VISCUSI, AEI-
BROOKINGS JOINT CTR. FOR REGULATORY STUDIES, DO FEDERAL REGULATIONS 
REDUCE MORTALITY? (2000); and Ralph Kenney, Mortality Risks Induced by Economic Ex-
penditures, 10 RISK ANALYSIS 147 (1990). 
 29 The author quotes Cloning, 2002: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Departments of Labor, 
Health and Human Servs., and Education, and Related Agencies of the S. Comm. on Appropria-
tions, 107th Cong. 19 (2002) (statement of Brent Blackwelder, President, Friends of the Earth).  
An internal quotation mark has been omitted. 
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“technologies and strategies that make human lives easier, more con-
venient, healthier, and longer” (p. 25). 
Unfortunately, Sunstein concludes, public irrationality of this sort 
cannot be dispelled by education.  The same mechanisms that cause 
members of the public to form exaggerated perceptions of risk will also 
prevent them from processing scientifically sound information in a ra-
tional way.  Because “people neglect probability,” for example, even 
accurate disclosure of risks may induce them to “fix, or fixate, on the 
bad outcome,” thereby “greatly alarm[ing] people . . . without giving 
them any useful information at all” (p. 123).  Rather than emphasize 
how small a risk is, a better way to dispel irrational fear, Sunstein ar-
gues, is to “[c]hange the subject” — “discuss something else and . . . let 
time do the rest” (p. 125). 
Ultimately, though, even this strategy of distraction is unlikely to 
calm public anxieties, because scientists and enlightened regulators 
aren’t the only ones speaking (or not) to the public.  “Terrorists[,] 
. . . environmentalists[,] and corporate executives,” among others, can 
all be expected to strategically “exploit probability neglect” and related 
dynamics (p. 65).  Propelled by “economic self-interest,” the news me-
dia, too, will intensify risk hysteria by reporting “[g]ripping instances” 
of misfortune, “whether or not representative” of the activities that 
give rise to them (p. 103). 
For Sunstein, there is only one credible treatment for the patholo-
gies that afflict public risk assessments: the delegation of regulatory 
authority to independent expert agencies.  “If the public demand for 
regulation is likely to be distorted by unjustified fear, a major role 
should be given to more insulated officials who are in a better position 
to judge whether risks are real” (p. 126). 
Such experts, Sunstein maintains, are relatively immune from the 
influences that inevitably distort public risk estimations.  Drawing on 
social psychology’s “dual-processing” model of cognition, Sunstein con-
trasts two forms of information processing: “System I,” which is “rapid, 
intuitive, and error prone” because pervaded by “[h]euristic-based 
thinking” of the sort responsible for exaggerated estimations of risk; 
and “System II,” which is “more deliberative, calculative, slower, and 
more likely to be error free” (p. 68).30  By virtue of their training, the 
time they have to reflect, and their reliance on one another rather than 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 30 For the classic statement of the “dual-processing” position, see Shelly Chaiken, Heuristic 
Versus Systematic Information Processing and the Use of Source Versus Message Cues in Persua-
sion, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 752 (1980).  The “System I/System II” terminology 
comes from Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick, Representativeness Revisited: Attribute Substi-
tution in Intuitive Judgment, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE 
JUDGMENT 49, 51 (Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin & Daniel Kahneman eds., 2002). 
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misguided popular sources of information, scientific experts can be ex-
pected to use System II reasoning when appraising risks (pp. 85–87). 
Investing politically independent experts with substantial authority, 
Sunstein insists, would not make risk assessment fundamentally un-
democratic.  “[W]ell-functioning governments,” he observes, “aspire to 
be deliberative democracies” (p. 1).  They take account of the public’s 
anxieties, but their “responsiveness is complemented by a commitment 
to deliberation, in the form of reflection and reason giving” (p. 1).  Ac-
cordingly, “if highly representative institutions, responding to public 
fear, are susceptible to error, then it is entirely appropriate to create in-
stitutions that will have a degree of insulation.  Democratic govern-
ments should respond to people’s values, not to their blunders”  
(p. 126). 
The principal device that expert regulators should use to distin-
guish public values from public misperceptions is cost-benefit analysis.  
Using this technique, regulators would assess the efficiency of risk-
abatement measures by comparing their own calculations of the mag-
nitude and probability of harm associated with risky technologies and 
substances to the value individuals (as revealed largely through market 
behavior) attach to life and limb (p. 131).31 
Although he acknowledges that this methodology is far from per-
fect, Sunstein holds that cost-benefit analysis furnishes an indispensa-
ble tool for the rational regulation of risk in a democracy.  Because it 
cleanses risk assessment of the contaminating influences of availability, 
probability neglect, affect, and the like, “[i]t is an important way of 
disciplining public fear — of creating a kind of System II corrective 
against System I heuristics and biases” (p. 130). 
Sunstein allows that cost-benefit analysis “provides [only] a place to 
start” and “should not be taken as decisive” for the law (p. 174).  On 
reflection, popularly accountable lawmakers might well conclude that 
other values, including the welfare of poor people, the protection of 
endangered species, or the preservation of pristine areas, are worth the 
cost of enduring economically inefficient regulation (p. 129).  
There is one particular type of popular veto, however, that Sun-
stein’s conception of “deliberative democracy” can rarely if ever abide: 
second-guessing of the magnitude that experts assign to various risks.   
 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 31 Here Sunstein advocates an approach that is largely consistent with that favored by ra-
tional-weigher theorists.  See, e.g., VISCUSI, supra note 15, at 126–28.  The difference, presuma-
bly, is that Sunstein would favor regulation in many contexts in which rational-weigher theorists 
are content to rely on markets.  See id. (arguing that markets, when they internalize relevant 
costs, better neutralize various forms of individual irrationality than do government agencies, 
which often magnify them). 
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Here, as elsewhere,32 Sunstein reacts with deep skepticism toward the 
“rival rationality” hypothesis, which depicts many disagreements be-
tween expert and lay perceptions of risk as grounded in differences of 
value, not knowledge.  “Often experts are aware of the facts and ordi-
nary people are not” (p. 86).  “Hence a form of irrationality, not a dif-
ferent set of values, often helps explain the different risk judgments of 
experts and ordinary people” (p. 86).  It is precisely to root out public 
irrationality in perceptions of the “cost” of risky technologies, in par-
ticular, that cost-benefit analysis by independent agencies is essential. 
II.  THE CULTURAL-EVALUATOR MODEL 
Sunstein’s account rests on an admirably comprehensive synthesis 
of the empirical literature on risk perception.  This literature, however, 
features an important dynamic to which Sunstein is strikingly inatten-
tive: the impact of cultural worldviews.  To set up our assessment of 
how this omission detracts from Sunstein’s account, we begin with a 
summary of the recent work in this area, which, we argue, supports an 
alternative to both the rational-weigher and irrational-weigher models 
of risk perception. 
A.  Cultural Cognition: Theory and Evidence 
The claim behind cultural cognition is that culture is prior to facts 
in societal disputes over risk.  Normatively, culture might be prior to 
facts in the sense that cultural values determine what significance in-
dividuals attach to the consequences of environmental regulation, gun 
control, drug criminalization, and the like.  But more importantly, cul-
ture is cognitively prior to facts in the sense that cultural values shape 
what individuals believe the consequences of such policies to be.  Indi-
viduals selectively credit and dismiss factual claims in a manner that 
supports their preferred vision of the good society. 
The priority of culture to fact is the organizing premise of the “cul-
tural theory of risk.”33  Associated most famously with the work of an-
thropologist Mary Douglas and political scientist Aaron Wildavsky,34 
the cultural theory of risk links disputes over environmental and tech-
nological risks to clusters of values that form competing cultural 
worldviews — egalitarian, individualistic, and hierarchical.  Egalitari-
ans, on this account, are naturally sensitive to environmental hazards, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 32 See Cass R. Sunstein, The Laws of Fear, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1119, 1122–37 (2002) (reviewing 
SLOVIC, supra note 10). 
 33 See generally Steve Rayner, Cultural Theory and Risk Analysis, in SOCIAL THEORIES OF 
RISK 83 (Sheldon Krimsky & Dominic Golding eds., 1992) (describing the theory and identifying 
its key theoretical underpinnings). 
 34 See MARY DOUGLAS & AARON WILDAVSKY, RISK AND CULTURE (1982). 
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the abatement of which justifies regulating commercial activities that 
produce social inequality.  Individualists, in contrast, predictably dis-
miss claims of environmental risk as specious, in line with their com-
mitment to the autonomy of markets and other private orderings.  
Hierarchists are similarly skeptical because they perceive warnings of 
imminent environmental catastrophe as threatening the competence of 
social and governmental elites. 
Although one can imagine alternative explanations for cultural 
variation in risk perceptions,35 cultural cognition offers a distinctively 
psychometric one.36  On this view, the impact of cultural worldviews is 
not an alternative to, but rather a vital component of, the various psy-
chological and social mechanisms that determine perceptions of risk.  
These mechanisms, cultural cognition asserts, are endogenous to cul-
ture.  That is, the direction in which they point risk perceptions de-
pends on individuals’ cultural values. 
Consider the affect heuristic.  Emotional responses to putatively 
dangerous activities strongly determine risk perceptions,37 but what 
determines whether those responses are positive or negative?  The an-
swer, according to cultural cognition, is culture: persons’ worldviews 
infuse various activities — firearm possession,38 nuclear power genera-
tion,39 red-meat consumption40 — with despised or valued social 
meanings, which in turn determine whether individuals react with 
anxiety or calmness, dread or admiration, toward those activities.  
This account recognizes, in line with the best psychological accounts, 
that emotions are not thoughtless surges of affect, but rather value-
laden judgments shaped by social norms.41 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 35 Douglas and Wildavsky, for example, suggest functionalist accounts in which individuals 
form beliefs congenial to their ways of life precisely because such beliefs promote those ways of 
life.  See MARY DOUGLAS, HOW INSTITUTIONS THINK 31–43 (1986); MICHAEL THOMPSON, 
RICHARD ELLIS & AARON WILDAVSKY, CULTURAL THEORY 104–07 (1990). 
 36 See generally J.M. BALKIN, CULTURAL SOFTWARE 9–10, 173–74 (1998) (suggesting the 
need for an account of cultural influences that rests on psychological mechanisms operating at the 
individual level). 
 37 See Slovic et al., supra note 26. 
 38 See Cultural Cognition Project, Yale Law Sch., Gun Risk Perceptions, http://research.yale. 
edu/culturalcognition/content/view/86/100/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2006). 
 39 See Ellen M. Peters, Burt Burraston & C.K. Mertz, An Emotion-Based Model of Risk Per-
ception and Stigma Susceptibility: Cognitive Appraisals of Emotion, Affective Reactivity, World-
views, and Risk Perceptions in the Generation of Technological Stigma, 24 RISK ANALYSIS 1349 
(2004). 
 40 See Michael W. Allen & Sik Hung Ng, Human Values, Utilitarian Benefits and Identifica-
tion: The Case of Meat, 33 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 37 (2003). 
 41 See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT: THE INTELLIGENCE OF 
EMOTIONS (2001); see also Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion 
in Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1996) (examining the influence of the cognitive concep-
tion of emotion in criminal law). 
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A similar account can be given of probability neglect.  Individuals 
display less sensitivity to the improbability of a bad outcome when 
that outcome is attended by intensely negative affect.  But insofar as 
the valence and strength of individuals’ affective responses are influ-
enced by their cultural appraisals of putatively dangerous activities 
(guns, nuclear power plants, drug use, casual sex, etc.), probability ne-
glect will again be culture dependent. 
Availability, too, is likely to be endogenous to culture.  The magni-
tude of a perceived risk depends on how readily an individual can re-
call instances of misfortune associated with that risk.  But how likely 
someone is to take note of such misfortunes and to recall them almost 
certainly depends on her values: to avoid cognitive dissonance, indi-
viduals are likely to attend selectively to information in a way that re-
inforces rather than undermines their commitment to the view that 
certain activities (say, gun possession, or economic commerce) are ei-
ther noble or base.42 
Culture will also condition the impact of social influences on risk 
perceptions.  Most individuals are not in a position to determine for 
themselves whether childhood vaccines induce autism, silicone breast 
implants cause immune system dysfunction, private firearm possession 
reduces or increases crime, and so on.  Accordingly, they must trust 
others to tell them which risk claims, supported by which forms of 
highly technical empirical evidence, to believe.  And the people they 
trust, not surprisingly, are the ones who share their cultural world-
views — and who are likely to be disposed to particular positions by 
virtue of affect, probability neglect, availability, and similar mecha-
nisms.  Risk perceptions are thus likely to be uniform within cultural 
groups and diverse across them.  Accordingly, group polarization and 
cascades are endogenous to culture, too. 
A considerable body of recent empirical research supports this ac-
count.  Using a variety of methods, researchers have demonstrated the 
influence of cultural worldviews on perceptions of environmental risks, 
particularly those associated with nuclear power.43 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 42 See Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, More Statistics, Less Persuasion: A Cultural Theory 
of Gun-Risk Perceptions, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1291, 1313–15 (2003); see also MARY DOUGLAS, 
PURITY AND DANGER: AN ANALYSIS OF CONCEPTS OF POLLUTION AND TABOO 39–40 
(1966) (suggesting that cognitive dissonance might cause persons to ignore harms by believing 
others are mistaken). 
 43 See, e.g., Karl Dake, Orienting Dispositions in the Perception of Risk: An Analysis of Con-
temporary Worldviews and Cultural Biases, 22 J. CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOL. 61 (1991); Hank 
C. Jenkins-Smith, Modeling Stigma: An Empirical Analysis of Nuclear Images of Nevada, in 
RISK, MEDIA, AND STIGMA: UNDERSTANDING PUBLIC CHALLENGES TO MODERN 
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 107–11 (James Flynn, Paul Slovic & Howard Kunreuther eds., 
2001); Ellen Peters & Paul Slovic, The Role of Affect and Worldviews as Orienting Dispositions in 
the Perception and Acceptance of Nuclear Power, 26 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1427, 1445–51 
(1996). 
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We have conducted our own National Risk and Culture Survey, de-
signed to establish the influence of cultural cognition on a broad 
scale.44  The study utilized Douglas’s well-known typology, which 
categorizes cultural ways of life along two cross-cutting dimensions, 
“group” and “grid.”45  Within “high group” ways of life, individuals 
“interact frequently and in a wide range of activities” in which they 
must “depend on each other,” a condition that “promotes values of 
solidarity”; in “low group” ways of life, in contrast, individuals are ex-
pected to “fend for themselves and therefore tend to be competitive.”46  
Persons who participate in a “high grid” way of life expect resources, 
opportunities, respect, and the like to be “distributed on the basis of 
explicit public social classifications, such as sex, color, . . . holding a 
bureaucratic office, [or] descent in a senior clan or lineage.”47  Those 
who adhere to a “low grid” way of life favor a “state of affairs in which 
no one is prevented from participating in any social role because he or 
she is the wrong sex, or is too old, or does not have the right family 
connections,” and so forth.48  After conducting an extensive review of 
ethnographic materials, conducting our own focus group discussions, 
and pretesting a wide variety of survey items, we developed two 
highly reliable attitude scales, “Individualism-solidarism” and “Hierar-
chy-egalitarianism,” that capture the key value conflicts among per-
sons located in different quadrants of the group/grid typology.49 
In a random national survey of 1800 persons, we used these scales 
to measure the impact of cultural worldviews on a diverse array of risk 
perceptions.  Our results confirmed Douglas and Wildavsky’s (and 
other researchers’) conclusions on the relationship between cultural 
worldviews and perceptions of environmental risks.  The more egali-
tarian and solidaristic persons are, the more concern they have about 
global warming, nuclear power, and pollution generally, whereas the 
more hierarchical and individualistic persons are, the less concern they 
have.50 
We found a similar relationship between cultural worldviews and 
perceptions of gun-related risks.  Relatively egalitarian and solidaristic 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 44 See Cultural Cognition Project, Yale Law Sch., National Risk & Culture Survey, http:// 
research.yale.edu/culturalcognition/content/view/45/89/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2006) (explaining 
methods and general findings of the survey). 
 45 MARY DOUGLAS, NATURAL SYMBOLS, at viii (1970). 
 46 Rayner, supra note 33, at 87–88. 
 47 JONATHAN L. GROSS & STEVE RAYNER, MEASURING CULTURE: A PARADIGM FOR 
THE ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL ORGANIZATION 6 (1985). 
 48 Rayner, supra note 33, at 87. 
 49 See Dan M. Kahan, Donald Braman, John Gastil, Paul Slovic & C.K. Mertz, Gender, Race, 
and Risk Perception app. at 38–40 (Yale Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Se-
ries, Paper No. 86, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=723762.   
 50 See id. at 15. 
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persons believe that widespread private ownership of guns undermines 
public safety by increasing the incidence of crime and gun accidents; 
relatively hierarchical and individualistic persons, in contrast, believe 
that widespread restrictions on private gun ownership undermine pub-
lic safety by rendering law-abiding persons unable to defend them-
selves from violent predation.51  These opposing perceptions of gun 
risks cohere with the negative and positive social meanings that guns 
bear, respectively, for persons of these cultural orientations.52 
Whereas individualists and hierarchists square off against solida-
rists and egalitarians on environmental and gun risks, on other issues 
individualists and hierarchists part ways.  Hierarchists worry, for ex-
ample, about the societal dangers of drug distribution and promiscuous 
sex, and the individual dangers of marijuana smoking; individualists 
do not.53  Likewise, egalitarians and individualists don’t worry much 
about the personal risks of obtaining an abortion or contracting AIDS 
from surgery; hierarchists worry a great deal about these risks.54  
These patterns also conform to the logic of the worldviews in question: 
hierarchists morally disapprove of behavior that defies conventional 
norms, and thus naturally believe that deviant behavior is dangerous; 
egalitarians morally disapprove of norms that rigidly stratify people, 
and individualists disapprove of norms that constrain individual 
choice generally, so these types naturally believe that deviant behavior 
is benign. 
B.  Cultural Evaluation Versus Rational and Irrational Weighing 
The empirical evidence supporting the phenomenon of cultural 
cognition generates a distinct model of risk perception.  We call it the 
“cultural-evaluator” model to emphasize the role that cultural values 
play in determining not only which outcomes individuals are willing to 
take risks to obtain, but also which empirical claims about risk they 
are likely to believe. 
This label also underscores our view that individual risk percep-
tions do not typically embody any sort of expected-utility weighing, ra-
tional or irrational.  Indeed, for most persons, such weighing is com-
pletely unnecessary: studies show that individuals’ perceptions of the 
benefits and risks of various putatively dangerous activities (from  
nuclear power to commercial aviation to handgun ownership) are  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 51 See id. at 18–21. 
 52 See Kahan & Braman, supra note 42, at 1299–1302. 
 53 Cultural Cognition Project, Yale Law Sch., Culture and Political Attitudes, http://research. 
yale.edu/culturalcognition/content/view/91/100/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2006). 
 54 Cultural Cognition Project, Yale Law Sch., Health Risk Perceptions, http://research.yale. 
edu/culturalcognition/content/view/102/100/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2006). 
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inversely correlated.55  Guided by judgment-infused emotions and mo-
tivated by their need to preserve their fundamental ties to others, indi-
viduals naturally conform their perceptions of both the costs and bene-
fits of such activities to the positive or negative social meanings with 
which those activities are imbued by cultural norms. 
In sum, individuals adopt stances toward risks that express their 
commitment to particular ways of life.  Their risk perceptions might or 
might not be accurate when evaluated from an actuarial standpoint; 
policies based on them might or might not be in the interest of society 
measured according to any welfarist metric.  Nevertheless, which  
activities individuals view as dangerous and which policies they view  
as effective embody coherent visions of social justice and individual  
virtue. 
III.  CULTURALLY EVALUATING SUNSTEIN 
We’ve suggested that Sunstein’s conception of the irrational-
weigher model is inattentive to the phenomenon of cultural cognition.  
We now consider how this inattention detracts from Sunstein’s diagno-
sis of the pathologies that afflict risk perceptions and from his recom-
mended institutional cures. 
A.  Descriptive Deficiencies 
Sunstein’s descriptive account of risk perception draws a sharp dis-
tinction between public risk assessments and expert ones.  The former 
are distorted by various cognitive and social dynamics that impel lay 
persons to fixate obsessively on risks of high emotional salience but of-
ten minimal consequence, and to disregard more serious threats to so-
cietal well-being.  The latter, in contrast, are characterized by the bal-
ance and accuracy associated with the calmer and more analytic 
modes of System II reasoning. 
The cultural-evaluator model suggests a richer and more nuanced 
picture that accounts for certain phenomena that Sunstein’s irrational-
weigher model does not satisfactorily explain.  These include system-
atic differences in risk perceptions among lay persons, the clustering of 
public risk perceptions across seemingly discrete issues, systematic dif-
ferences of opinion among risk experts, and the intensity of political 
conflict surrounding risk regulation. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 55 See SLOVIC, supra note 10, at 404–05 (noting that many persons associate high-benefit ac-
tions with low risks, and vice versa); Cultural Cognition Project, Yale Law Sch., Gun Risk Atti-
tudes, http://research.yale.edu/culturalcognition/index.php?option=content&task=view&id=99 (last 
visited Jan. 15, 2006) (noting the inverse correlation between perceptions of gun risks and  
benefits). 
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1.  Individual Differences. — Lay persons disagree not only with 
experts but also with one another about the magnitude of various 
risks.  These disagreements, moreover, are far from random.  They 
highly correlate with characteristics such as gender, race, political ori-
entation, and religion, and they persist even after controlling for edu-
cation and other information-related influences.56 
These systematic individual differences pose an obvious challenge 
to the rational-weigher model of risk perception.  The idea that indi-
viduals respond to risk in a manner that maximizes their expected util-
ity certainly allows for heterogeneity in the benefits individuals attach 
to risky activities.  But if individuals, in aggregate and over time, are 
rationally processing information about risk, differences in their esti-
mations of the magnitude of various risks should essentially just be 
noise — products of random variation that display no intelligible pat-
terns across persons. 
The irrational-weigher model also fails to explain such differences.  
It’s implausible to think that men are more or less vulnerable than 
women, whites more or less vulnerable than minorities, Republicans 
more or less vulnerable than Democrats, or Catholics more or less vul-
nerable than Protestants or Jews to the distorting influence of avail-
ability, probability neglect, status quo bias, affect, and the like.57 
To his credit, Sunstein’s particular emphasis on social influences 
does suggest a reason why risk perceptions might vary cross-culturally.  
Even initially “small or random” differences in the distribution of per-
ceptions across space will predictably grow in intensity and ultimately 
become sharply pronounced as a result of “availability cascades” and 
“group polarization”: 
Because different social influences can be found in different communities, 
local variations are inevitable, with different examples becoming salient in 
each.  Hence such variations — between, say, New York and Ohio, or 
England and the United States, or between Germany and France — might 
involve coincidence . . . .  Indeed the different reactions to nuclear power 
in France and the United States can be explained in large part in this way.  
And when some groups concentrate on cases in which guns increased vio-
lence, and others on cases in which guns decreased violence, availability 
cascades are a large part of the reason.  “Many Germans believe  
that drinking water after eating cherries is deadly; they also believe that  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 56 See Kahan et al., supra note 49 (presenting data showing the influence of various individual 
characteristics on risk perceptions). 
 57 Researchers have explicitly ruled out such differences in the case of gender.  See, e.g., 
Charles R. Berger, Eun-Ju Lee & Joel T. Johnson, Gender, Rationality, and Base-Rate Explana-
tions for Increasing Trends, 30 COMM. RES. 737, 758 (2003); Stuart J. McKelvie, The Availability 
Heuristic: Effects of Fame and Gender on the Estimated Frequency of Male and Female Names, 
137 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 63 (1997); Craig W. Trumbo, Information Processing and Risk Perception: 
An Adaptation of the Heuristic-Systematic Model, 52 J. COMM. 367, 379 (2002).  
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putting ice in soft drinks is unhealthy.  The English, however, rather  
enjoy a cold drink of water after some cherries; and Americans love icy  
refreshments.”  (p. 96)58 
But as Sunstein’s own description suggests, this type of “cultural” 
account predicts that group differences should be largely geographic in 
nature.  If salient or gripping examples of misfortune (as well as over-
represented opinions or arguments) spread from one person to another 
within geographic communities — in much the same way that an in-
fectious disease does — there would be little reason to expect Jews, Af-
rican Americans, and women in New York to be more like Jews, Afri-
can Americans, and women in Ohio than they are like Protestants, 
whites, and men in New York.  But in fact religious, racial, and gender 
effects persist even when controlling for region. 
Of course, random variations within other, nongeographic commu-
nities — professional or occupational ones, for example, or perhaps 
Internet discussion groups comprising persons with common voca-
tional or political interests — might also blossom into systematic dif-
ferences in risk perceptions as individuals within those communities 
interact.  But it’s necessary to resort to fairly complex and largely ad 
hoc conjectures to link differences of these sorts to the well-defined 
forms of variation actually seen across social groups. 
The cultural-evaluator model, in contrast, suggests a coherent and 
parsimonious explanation for such variation.  That model explicitly 
posits that risk perceptions will vary across persons in patterns that re-
flect and reinforce their cultural worldviews.  Gender, ethnicity, relig-
ion, political orientation, and like characteristics correlate with such 
outlooks.59  It follows that cultural variation in risk perceptions will 
manifest itself in systematic differences in risk perception across differ-
ent social groups. 
The results of our National Risk and Culture Survey confirm this 
conclusion.  Consistent with previous research, we found that factors 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 58 The author quotes Joseph Henrich, Wulf Albers, Robert Boyd, Gerd Gigerenzer, Kevin A. 
McCabe, Axel Ockenfels & H. Peyton Young, Group Report: What Is the Role of Culture in 
Bounded Rationality?, in BOUNDED RATIONALITY 343, 353 (G. Gigerenzer & R. Selten eds., 
2001). 
 59 See Kahan et al., supra note 49, at 6–7.  For this reason, these and similar demographic 
characteristics are commonly used as proxies for distinctive cultural norms.  See, e.g., RAYMOND 
D. GASTIL, CULTURAL REGIONS OF THE UNITED STATES (1975) (charting regional correla-
tions with cultural values); CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL 
THEORY AND WOMEN’S DEVELOPMENT (1982) (using gender as an indicator of commitment 
to certain moral sensibilities); RICHARD E. NISBETT & DOV COHEN, CULTURE OF HONOR: 
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF VIOLENCE IN THE SOUTH 1–2 (1996) (using region of residence as rep-
resentative of a shared cultural and psychological background); Gary Kleck, Crime, Culture Con-
flict and the Sources of Support for Gun Control: A Multilevel Application of the General Social 
Surveys, 39 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 387 (1996) (using race, class, gender, and region as proxies 
for cultural norms). 
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such as income, education, community type (rural or urban), political 
ideology, and personality type do predict various risk perceptions.  But 
we also found that cultural worldviews exert significantly and substan-
tially more predictive power than these characteristics.  Seemingly sig-
nificant gender and race variances in risk perceptions also turn out to 
be artifacts of culture-specific differences in risk perceptions related to 
gender and race differences in social roles within hierarchical and (to a 
lesser extent) individualistic ways of life.60 
Indeed, even the sorts of geographic variations that Sunstein fo-
cuses on are best understood as reflecting variance in cultural com-
mitments over space.  The difference between French and U.S. atti-
tudes toward nuclear power, and the resulting differences in the 
regulations of the two nations, are hardly a matter of “coincidence” or 
chance.  In contrast to members of the public in the United States, 
those in France are much more likely to hold a hierarchical world-
view.61  This difference not only disposes the French to be more ac-
cepting of nuclear power risks, but also to be more confident in the 
ability of technical and governmental elites to manage any such 
risks.62 
In other words, membership in various social groups (including 
sometimes entire nations) predicts risk perceptions only because those 
groups are proxies for culture.  Moreover, because they are only prox-
ies, their unique influence fades to insignificance in a model that di-
rectly accounts for cultural worldviews. 
2.  Belief Clustering. — Risk perceptions not only vary systemati-
cally across social groups; they also cohere across seemingly discrete 
issues.  How likely one is to perceive global warming to be a threat, 
for example, predicts how much one worries about gun accidents, 
which in turn tells us whether one regards abortion as a dangerous 
medical procedure and marijuana as a dangerous drug.63 
This feature of public risk perceptions also defies the conventional 
models.  Because as an empirical matter nothing about the size of any 
one of these risks entails anything about the size of any other, we 
wouldn’t expect persons behaving like rational weighers to divide into 
opposing groups on these matters.  Nor is it at all clear why persons 
behaving like irrational weighers would form these particular packages 
of risk perceptions.  Nothing in the relative salience, familiarity, or 
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 60 See Kahan et al., supra note 49, at 16–18. 
 61 See Paul Slovic, James Flynn, C.K. Mertz, Marc Poumadère & Claire Mays, Nuclear Power 
and the Public: A Comparative Study of Risk Perception in France and the United States, in 
CROSS-CULTURAL RISK PERCEPTION: A SURVEY OF EMPIRICAL STUDIES 55, 93–94 (Ortwin 
Renn & Bernd Rohrmann eds., 2000). 
 62 See id. at 87–90, 93–94, 98. 
 63 See Kahan et al., supra note 49, at 24–28.  
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evocative imagery of any one of these risks connects in any logical or 
practical way to those features of the others.  There’s also nothing in-
trinsic to Sunstein’s irrational-weigher model that should lead us to 
expect those who do or don’t take seriously one of these risks (say, of 
global warming or of marijuana use) to be any more likely to exchange 
information with others who do or don’t take seriously some other risk 
(say, of gun accidents or of health complications from abortion). 
The cultural-evaluator model, however, readily explains belief clus-
tering.  The meanings of these diverse risks — the values expressed by 
the activities that give rise to the risks, and by governmental regula-
tion of the same — cohere in intelligible ways.  The idea that guns are 
dangerous and worthy of regulation, for example, threatens hierarchi-
cal roles and denigrates individualistic virtues; the threat of global 
warming impugns the competence of hierarchical elites and invites in-
terference with markets and other forms of private orderings that in-
dividualists prize.  It is therefore perfectly sensible to expect hierar-
chists and individualists to believe both that guns are not dangerous 
and global warming is not a serious threat, and for egalitarians and 
solidarists to believe otherwise.  Our data found this very pattern,  
and others that reflect the expressive coherence of these opposing  
worldviews.64 
3.  Expert Variation. — Sunstein’s account seeks to identify the 
mechanisms that impel members of the public to wildly overestimate 
the importance of risks that experts view with much less concern.  But 
experts themselves are hardly of one mind about societal risks.  Nearly 
every public belief cited by Sunstein as a product of some public “risk 
panic” — that nuclear power is dangerous,65 that arsenic in drinking 
water poses a health threat,66 that mad cow disease is a serious con-
cern67 — is shared by some scientists and rejected by others.  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 64 See supra pp. 1086–87. 
 65 See NUCLEAR POWER: BOTH SIDES (Michio Kaku & Jennifer Trainer eds., 1982).   
 66 Compare COMM. ON TOXICOLOGY, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ARSENIC IN 
DRINKING WATER: 2001 UPDATE 214 (2001) (concluding, based on epidemiological studies, that 
arsenic exposure within existing regulatory standards might significantly increase cancer risk), 
with Michael N. Bates, Allan H. Smith & Kenneth P. Cantor, Case-Control Study of Bladder Can-
cer and Arsenic in Drinking Water, 141 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 523 (1995) (concluding that cities 
with levels of arsenic in drinking water below existing standards do not significantly differ in the 
incidence of bladder cancer from those with levels above the standards).   
 67 Compare Jerry Hagstrom, Expert: U.S. Should Follow Japanese on Mad Cow Testing, 
CONGRESS DAILY, Mar. 17, 2004, 2004 WLNR 17658586 (reporting the view of a Nobel Prize–
winning scientist who discovered the mad cow infectious agent that the disease is “the greatest 
threat to the safety of the human food supply in modern times” (quoting Stanley Prusiner, Profes-
sor, Univ. of Cal., S.F.) (internal quotation marks omitted)), with Joshua T. Cohen, Keith Duggar, 
George M. Gray, Silvia Kreindel, Hatim Abdelrahman, Tsegaye HabteMariam, David Oryang & 
Berhanu Tameru, Evaluation of the Potential for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy 112 (Oct. 
2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Harvard Law School Library), available at 
http://www.hcra.harvard.edu/pdf/madcow.pdf (“[E]ven if BSE were somehow to arise in the U.S., 
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Expert disagreement per se does not necessarily defy Sunstein’s ac-
count.  The empirical evidence surrounding many important societal 
risks is often conflicting and in some instances scant.  Employing the 
methodical and dispassionate forms of analysis associated with System 
II reasoning, experts could well come to different conclusions in these 
circumstances. 
The problem, however, is that the nature of expert disagreement 
belies this account of its causes.  As is true of disagreements among 
members of the public generally, disagreements among risk experts are 
distributed in patterns that cannot plausibly be linked either to access 
to information or capacity to understand it.  Gender, for example, pre-
dicts systematic differences in risk perceptions among experts,68 as do 
political ideology and institutional affiliation (academic or industrial).69  
Because these sorts of characteristics are all plausible proxies for cul-
tural orientation, variance along these lines suggests that cultural cog-
nition is figuring in expert judgments of risk, too.  Research that one of 
us has conducted (independent of the National Risk and Culture Sur-
vey) supports exactly this conclusion.70 
There are at least two possible ways in which cultural cognition 
could exert this impact on expert risk assessments.  One is that cultural 
worldviews might induce experts, like members of the public generally, 
to engage in heuristic-driven System I forms of reasoning pervaded by 
biases such as availability and probability neglect. 
But a second and even more plausible explanation is that cultural 
worldviews are biasing the more reflective System II forms of reason-
ing associated with expert judgment.  Sunstein maintains that System 
II reasoning is “more likely to be error free” because it is “more delib-
erative [and] calculative” (p. 68).  But a wealth of research on dual-
process reasoning suggests that the truth is much more complicated.  
System II reasoning often furnishes less reliable guidance than  
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few additional animals would become infected, little infectivity would be available for potential 
human exposure, and the disease would be eradicated.  In short, the U.S. appears very resistant to 
a BSE challenge . . . .”). 
 68 See, e.g., Richard P. Barke, Hank Jenkins-Smith & Paul Slovic, Risk Perceptions of Men 
and Women Scientists, 78 SOC. SCI. Q. 167, 172–75 (1997).  
 69 See SLOVIC, supra note 10, at 286, 311–12. 
 70 See id. at 406–09 (describing studies in which cultural worldviews explained variance 
among scientists).  Douglas Kysar and James Salzman convincingly attribute expert, as well as 
public, disagreement over risk to conflicting worldviews.  See Douglas A. Kysar & James 
Salzman, Environmental Tribalism, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1099, 1111–16 (2003). 
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System I.71  Among the reasons this is so is the vulnerability of even 
System II reasoning to various biasing influences.72 
One such influence is known as “defense motivation.”73  Informa-
tion that challenges beliefs essential to one’s group identity poses a 
threat to one’s perception of one’s status.  To repel that threat, indi-
viduals (subconsciously) screen arguments and evidence to protect 
their existing beliefs.  Such screening operates whether individuals are 
engaged in either heuristic reasoning or more reflective reasoning.74  In 
effect, defense motivation biases individuals’ use of System II reason-
ing, causing them to use deliberate, calculating, and methodical analy-
sis to support beliefs dominant within their group and to debunk chal-
lenges to those beliefs.75 
This is most likely the dynamic that generates group-based dis-
agreement among risk experts.  Like members of the general public, 
experts are inclined to form attitudes toward risk that best express 
their cultural vision.  The only difference, if any, is that experts are 
more likely to use System II reasoning to do so. 
4.  Political Conflict. — Highly charged disputes about risk occupy 
a conspicuous position in American political life.  How (if at all) to re-
spond to global warming, whether to enact or repeal gun control laws, 
what sorts of policies to adopt to combat domestic terrorism, and like 
issues generate intense public conflict.  The power to explain the 
prevalence of intense conflict over risk regulation is another advantage 
of the cultural-evaluator model over Sunstein’s irrational-weigher 
model. 
To be sure, the centrality of risk regulation in democratic politics is 
perfectly compatible with Sunstein’s position.  Many risk regulation 
issues are of obvious consequence to the well-being of society.  More-
over, because such issues usually involve highly gripping and evocative 
instances of harm, they predictably trigger a self-reinforcing wave of 
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 71 See, e.g., Slovic et al., supra note 26, at 320 (noting that expert chess players and mathema-
ticians perform better when relying on tacit or heuristic rather than purely analytic reasoning, and 
arguing that “risk as feeling may outperform risk as analysis” in settings such as security screening 
at airports). 
 72 See, e.g., Shelly Chaiken & Durairaj Maheswaran, Heuristic Processing Can Bias System-
atic Processing: Effects of Source Credibility, Argument Ambiguity, and Task Importance on Atti-
tude Judgment, 66 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 460 (1994); Serena Chen, Kimberly 
Duckworth & Shelly Chaiken, Motivated Heuristic and Systematic Processing, 10 PSYCHOL. 
INQUIRY 44 (1999). 
 73 See Roger Giner-Sorolla & Shelly Chaiken, Selective Use of Heuristic and Systematic Proc-
essing Under Defense Motivation, 23 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 84, 85 (1997). 
 74 See id. at 85–86; see also Geoffrey L. Cohen, Party over Policy: The Dominating Impact of 
Group Influence on Political Beliefs, 85 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 808 (2003) (finding 
that experimental subjects using systematic reasoning are still disposed to credit arguments condi-
tional on sharing a group allegiance with the source of the arguments). 
 75 See Chen et al., supra note 72, at 45. 
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public anxiety to which democratically accountable institutions inevi-
tably react (indeed, overreact).76 
What confounds Sunstein’s account, however, is the highly con-
flictual nature of risk regulation politics.  If public attention were be-
ing driven solely by mechanisms like availability, probability neglect, 
cascades, and group polarization, we would expect members of the 
public and democratically accountable government officials to be uni-
formly impelled toward increasingly restrictive forms of regulation of 
the sort counseled by the precautionary principle.  This is the story 
that Stephen Breyer, Sunstein’s irrational-weigher comrade in arms, 
tells about the regulatory process.77  But the truth is that risk regula-
tion politics are not nearly so one-sided.  Public demand for regulatory 
responses to global warming, gun accidents, terrorism, and similar 
sources of risk generates equally intense public opposition to the same. 
This is exactly the state of affairs one would predict under the cul-
tural-evaluator model.  As a result of cultural cognition, individuals of 
diverse cultural persuasions are endowed with competing affective re-
sponses toward putatively dangerous activities, and are thus impelled 
toward opposing stances on risk issues. 
The cultural-evaluator model not only explains why risk regulation 
politics are conflictual, but also why those on both sides advance their 
positions with such intensity.  Sociologist Joseph Gusfield describes as 
symbolic “status conflicts” political disputes in which the adherents of 
opposing cultural styles compete for esteem.78  In such struggles, op-
posing cultural groups mobilize to enact legislation that “glorifies the 
values of one group and demeans those of another,” thereby “en-
hanc[ing] the social status of . . . the affirmed culture” at the expense of 
the one “condemned as deviant.”79  Because individuals care as much 
about their status as they do about their material welfare, “[t]he strug-
gle to control the symbolic actions of government is often as bitter and 
as fateful as the struggle to control its tangible effects.”80  Important 
historical examples include battles over temperance and civil rights;81 
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 76 See supra pp. 1078–79. 
 77 See BREYER, supra note 14, at 33–51.  
 78 JOSEPH R. GUSFIELD, SYMBOLIC CRUSADE: STATUS POLITICS AND THE AMERICAN 
TEMPERANCE MOVEMENT 21 (2d ed. 1986); Joseph R. Gusfield, On Legislating Morals: The 
Symbolic Process of Designating Deviance, 56 CAL. L. REV. 54 (1968). 
 79 Gusfield, supra note 78, at 57–58. 
 80 GUSFIELD, supra note 78, at 167. 
 81 See id. at 22–24. 
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contemporary examples include the battles over capital punishment,82 
gay rights,83 and hate crime laws.84 
Disputes over risk regulation fit this pattern.  Because they evoca-
tively symbolize the worldviews of hierarchists and egalitarians, indi-
vidualists and solidarists, regulations of drugs, guns, sexual promiscu-
ity, and other putatively dangerous activities inevitably come to signify 
whose stock is up and whose down in the incessant competition for so-
cial esteem.  What seem like highly technical and often highly uncer-
tain empirical disputes among experts galvanize the public because 
these controversies are in truth “the product of an ongoing political 
debate about the ideal society.”85 
B.  Normative and Prescriptive Deficiencies 
Although Sunstein purports to be reconciling risk regulation with 
“deliberative democracy,” his proposed regulatory reforms are neither 
particularly deliberative nor particularly democratic.  Sunstein’s cen-
tral prescription is to redirect risk regulation from “highly representa-
tive institutions” to “more insulated” experts (p. 126).  Rather than try 
to inject scientifically sound information into public discourse, gov-
ernment officials should endeavor to “[c]hange the subject” — “to dis-
cuss something else” in order to divert public attention away from 
“facts that will predictably cause high levels of alarm” (pp. 123–25).  
The cultural-evaluator model, in contrast, supports an approach to 
risk regulation that is much more consistent with participatory and de-
liberative visions of democracy. 
1.  Information and Cultural-Identity Affirmation. — To start, Sun-
stein is likely far too pessimistic about the possibility of public educa-
tion.  Sunstein’s preference for distracting rather than educating the 
public reflects his assumption that ordinary citizens lack the time and 
capacity to process information through reflective System II forms of 
reasoning as opposed to heuristic-driven System I ones.  As we have 
emphasized, Sunstein overstates the accuracy of System II reasoning 
relative to System I.86  But even more important, because he fails to 
perceive the endogeneity of risk perception mechanisms to culture, 
Sunstein overlooks the possibility of risk communication techniques 
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 82 See, e.g., Barbara Ann Stolz, Congress and Capital Punishment: An Exercise in Symbolic 
Politics, 5 LAW & POL’Y Q. 157 (1983). 
 83 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Pluralism and Distrust: How Courts Can Support De-
mocracy by Lowering the Stakes of Politics, 114 YALE L.J. 1279, 1289–92 (2005). 
 84 See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413, 463–
67 (1999). 
 85 DOUGLAS & WILDAVSKY, supra note 34, at 36. 
 86 See supra pp. 1093–94. 
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that make System I reasoning itself responsive to scientifically sound 
information. 
The best work in dual-process reasoning supports the conclusion 
that individuals are motivated by a form of status anxiety to resist in-
formation that portends regulatory action that would denigrate their 
cultural values.87  It follows that individuals can be made more recep-
tive to such information when it is communicated to them in forms 
that affirm their status.  Research by social psychologists Geoffrey 
Cohen, Joshua Aronson, and Claude Steele, for example, shows that 
individuals are much more willing to change their minds on charged 
issues like the death penalty and abortion immediately after exposure 
to self-affirming information, such as their high performance on a test 
or their possession of some desirable personal attribute.88  Self-
affirmation of this sort buffers the threat to self that otherwise moti-
vates individuals to resist acceptance of information at odds with be-
liefs dominant within their identity-defining group.89 
There is a political analog of this self-affirmation effect.  It involves 
affirming the selves of those who might resist information about a so-
cietal danger by tying that information to a proposed policy solution 
that itself affirms the resisters’ cultural commitments. 
For a plausible historical example, consider the softening of conser-
vative opposition to air pollution regulation in the late 1980s and early 
1990s.  Individualists tend to resist the idea that commerce threatens 
the environment, because that conclusion implies that society ought to 
constrain market behavior and like forms of private ordering.  Yet 
when the idea of tradable emissions permits — a market solution to 
the problem of air pollution — was devised during the highly indi-
vidualistic first Bush Administration, pro-market forces in the Repub-
lican Party stopped resisting.90  Shown a solution that affirmed their 
cultural values, it became easier, cognitively, for individualists to  
accept the idea that there was a problem to be dealt with after all.   
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 87 See supra p. 1094; see also Kahan et al., supra note 49. 
 88 See Geoffrey L. Cohen, Joshua Aronson & Claude M. Steele, When Beliefs Yield to Evi-
dence: Reducing Biased Evaluation by Affirming the Self, 26 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
BULL. 1151 (2000). 
 89 See id.; see also Geoffrey L. Cohen, David K. Sherman, Michelle McGoey, Lillian Hsu, An-
thony Bastardi & Lee Ross, Bridging the Partisan Divide: Self-Affirmation Reduces Ideological 
Closed-Mindedness and Inflexibility (Sept. 10, 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the 
Harvard Law School Library), available at http://research.yale.edu/culturalcognition/documents/ 
cohen_self_affirmation_draft.pdf.  See generally David K. Sherman & Geoffrey L. Cohen, Accept-
ing Threatening Information: Self-Affirmation and the Reduction of Defensive Biases, 11 CUR-
RENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 119 (2002) (summarizing self-affirmation research).   
 90 See PROJECT 88, HARNESSING MARKET FORCES TO PROTECT OUR ENVIRONMENT: 
INITIATIVES FOR THE NEW PRESIDENT 26–29 (1988); Robert N. Stavins, What Can We Learn 
from the Grand Policy Experiment? Lessons from SO2 Allowance Trading, J. ECON. PERSP., 
Summer 1998, at 69, 76. 
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Hierarchists, who tend to resist claims of environmental danger as im-
plicit criticisms of social elites, also likely felt affirmed by a policy that 
promised to improve air quality by empowering rather than constrain-
ing commercial firms.91 
For a contemporary example, consider the global warming contro-
versy.  The assertion of this risk is also seen by individualists as 
threatening the autonomy of markets and by hierarchists as impugning 
the competence of social and governmental elites.  Consequently, both 
downplay the threat posed by global warming (or deny its very exis-
tence).  But recently, groups with varying ideologies have started to 
tout renewed investment in nuclear power as a way to reduce the fossil 
fuel emissions primarily responsible for global warming.92  The self-
affirmation effect described by Cohen and his collaborators suggests 
why this strategy might work.  Individualists and hierarchists both 
support nuclear power, which is emblematic of the very cultural values 
that are threatened by society’s recognition of the global warming risk.  
Shown a solution that affirms their identities, individualists and hier-
archists can be expected to display less resistance — not just politi-
cally, but cognitively — to the proposition that global warming is a 
problem after all. 
Indeed, when egalitarians and solidarists are exposed to the mes-
sage that nuclear power can reduce global warming, they are likely to 
perceive nuclear power to be less dangerous.  The affirmation of their 
identity associated with recognition of the global warming threat re-
duces a cognitive impediment to accepting information that they have 
long resisted about nuclear safety. 
In these examples, we have assumed scientific consensus both that 
air pollution and global warming are serious environmental threats 
and that nuclear power is reasonably safe.  But in conditions of scien-
tific uncertainty, the same strategy of cultural-identity affirmation 
could be used to make a culturally diverse public receptive to what-
ever empirical information might eventually emerge in support of poli-
cies that advance society’s shared interests.  Comparative law scholar 
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 91 Although the policy was initially proposed by environmentalists who broke with the con-
ventional egalitarian and solidaristic fear of using market mechanisms to induce risk abatement, 
see, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law: The Democ-
ratic Case for Market Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 171, 178–88 (1988), President Bush 
seized on this approach to deflect Democratic Party attacks on his commitment to the environ-
ment without alienating his conservative, pro-business base, see Robert W. Hahn & Robert N. 
Stavins, Incentive-Based Environmental Regulation: A New Era from an Old Idea?, 18 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 28 (1991); Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Student Article, Emissions Allowance Trading 
Under the Clean Air Act: A Model for Future Environmental Regulations?, 7 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 
352, 363–64 (1999). 
 92 See Craig Gilbert, Cheney Argues Case for Nuclear Plants, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, 
June 14, 2001, at 16A; Nicholas D. Kristof, Op-Ed., Nukes Are Green, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2005, 
at A19. 
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Mary Ann Glendon, for example, discusses an abortion law in France 
that simultaneously affirmed the identity of hierarchists, by permitting 
abortion not on demand but only in circumstances of “personal emer-
gency,” and the identity of egalitarians and individualists, by treating 
an individual woman’s declaration of personal emergency as effec-
tively unreviewable by government officials.93  According to Glendon, 
this legislation dissipated cultural conflict and created a climate in 
which both sides came to accept previously disputed factual informa-
tion about the efficacy of certain social welfare policies in reducing 
demand for abortion.94 
We can imagine a similar strategy to promote receptivity to sound 
information on gun risks.  Egalitarians and solidarists focus on the risk 
that too little gun control will lead to more gun accidents and crimes, 
hierarchists and individualists on the risk that too much will leave per-
sons helpless when facing criminal predation.95  We will assume that 
existing empirical evidence — which is voluminous and conflicting — 
does not now support a confident conclusion either way.96  Neverthe-
less, a policy those on both sides might accept is a “bounty,” in the 
form of a tax rebate or other monetary reward, for individuals who 
register handguns. 
A registration bounty would affirm the cultural identities of both 
control supporters and control opponents simultaneously because both 
could see it as an effective and fair solution to a collective action prob-
lem, albeit a different one for each group.  For control supporters, the 
relevant public good is the reduction of gun crime; registration con-
tributes to that good by making it easier to trace the ownership of 
weapons used to commit crimes.  Consistent with egalitarian and soli-
daristic sensibilities, control supporters can thus envision the bounty as 
equitably compensating individuals for being made to bear a burden 
that benefits society at large.  For control opponents, in contrast, the 
relevant public good is the reduction of violent crime in a community 
in which a relatively high proportion of individuals own guns.  Be-
cause they do not believe individuals should be expected to endure 
disproportionate burdens to benefit society at large, individualists  
will think it is perfectly appropriate to compensate individual gun  
owners for the contribution they are making to public safety generally.   
So will hierarchists, who can see the bounty as a fitting public  
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 93 See MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW 15 (1987). 
 94 See id. at 15–20. 
 95 See Kahan et al., supra note 49, at 18–21. 
 96 See COMM. TO IMPROVE RESEARCH INFO. & DATA ON FIREARMS, NAT’L RESEARCH 
COUNCIL, FIREARMS AND VIOLENCE: A CRITICAL REVIEW 120–50 (Charles F. Wellford, 
John V. Pepper & Carol V. Petrie eds., 2004) (summarizing studies and determining that evidence 
is inconclusive). 
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acknowledgement of the virtuous willingness of gun owners to pro-
mote the common good.97 
Agreement of any sort might be viewed as a step forward in the 
American gun policy stalemate.  But the real payoff is opening the 
public’s mind to facts.  Any policy that simultaneously affirms the 
identities of culturally diverse citizens makes all of them more recep-
tive to information that they might otherwise have found lacking in 
credibility.  The lesson for risk communicators isn’t that they have to 
“change the subject” so much as change the discourse to make new 
empirical findings compatible with a plurality of worldviews. 
2.  Cultural Cognition and Deliberative Debiasing. — In Sunstein’s 
view, any attempt to undertake public discussions would lead inexora-
bly to mass polarization, with preexisting biases amplifying themselves 
in the echo chamber of mass media or even in the confines of a face-to-
face discussion.  Such a result might occur, but to say it is inevitable 
underestimates persons’ discursive capacities and the potential those 
capacities have to counteract the biasing effects of cultural cognition. 
Research on the polarizing effect of deliberation on political deci-
sionmaking is actually quite mixed.  Indeed, a formidable body of em-
pirical research shows that deliberation at least sometimes generates 
convergence and moderation of opinion.98  Group-communication re-
searchers have catalogued various procedures that help ameliorate  
polarization.99  In many political decisionmaking contexts, such  
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 97 For an elaboration of this proposal and others aimed at resolving the cultural impasse over 
guns in American society, see Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Overcoming the Fear of Guns, 
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People, in THE DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY HANDBOOK 111, 112–15 (John Gastil & Peter 
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procedures have been used to promote successful deliberative solutions 
on many issues that are culturally fraught.100 
These procedures work, in part, because they help dissipate the po-
tential of cultural cognition to generate conflict.  First, carefully struc-
tured deliberation does sometimes appear to enable individuals to en-
gage in a culturally debiased form of System II reasoning.101  Political 
scientist James Fishkin has developed deliberative processes, such as 
the Deliberative Poll, that use expert moderators whose intervention 
appears at least sometimes to induce citizens to change their minds on 
contested issues of fact.102  The Twenty-First Century Town Meeting, 
a deliberative format designed by Carolyn Lukensmeyer, uses similar 
techniques and has generated similar results.103 
Deliberation can also improve public information-processing by 
forging a shared civic identity alternative to individuals’ cultural af-
filiations.104  Individuals tend to find the members of any in-group 
more credible than the members of any out-group.105  The evidence we 
have collected on culture and risk suggests that cultural affinity is the 
dominant in-group when individuals appraise risk.  But as they engage 
one another in earnest face-to-face deliberation, individuals committed 
to resolving an important common problem typically form strong  
emotional bonds.106  It’s plausible to imagine that these connections  
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generate a group identity that, for the period of deliberation at least, 
displaces cultural affiliations as individuals’ dominant reference point.  
If so, individuals, while they are deliberating together, might experi-
ence relief from the sense of threat to self that makes them resist in-
formation at odds with their culturally grounded prior beliefs.  This 
effect could explain the consensus that some researchers and practi-
tioners report among deliberation participants.107 
Finally, deliberation can alter individuals’ understandings of the re-
lationship between their cultural affiliations and particular beliefs.  On 
this view, what individuals learn in the course of deliberation isn’t so 
much new information about the facts being debated but rather new 
information about the identities of those who hold particular factual 
beliefs.  If participants come to see either that a particular belief is less 
dominant among their cultural peers than they had imagined or that 
cultural peers who deviate from the dominant belief are not censured 
as severely as they had anticipated, participants are likely to revise 
their view about the social cost — or more accurately the social mean-
ing108 — of changing their mind. 
This conjecture is supported by a number of other recognized psy-
chological processes.  One is the “false consensus effect,” which refers 
to the tendency of individuals to form an exaggerated sense of the de-
gree to which members of their referent group hold a particular posi-
tion.109  This bias is likely to generate a self-sustaining condition of 
“pluralistic ignorance” to the extent that individuals are motivated to 
represent their adherence of this belief to others, who will in turn feel 
constrained to represent that they hold the belief, notwithstanding 
widespread reservations.110  Deliberation might conceivably break this 
cycle of shared misunderstanding if, contrary to expectations, indi-
viduals discover that others who share their group identity do not in 
fact uniformly hold the belief in question.111  As they revise downward 
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their estimation of the prevalence of the view within their group, indi-
viduals will feel less threatened by, and thus become more receptive to, 
information at odds with their culturally grounded prior beliefs.112 
Although it is admittedly speculative, this account of how delibera-
tion can ameliorate the distorting influence of cultural cognition is 
nonetheless supported by one real-world approach to risk manage-
ment.  Social psychologist Robin Gregory has devised deliberative pro-
cedures aimed at generating “science-based, community-supported” 
environmental risk policies.113  In what he calls “structured, value-
focused” decisionmaking, interested parties from the affected commu-
nity first deliberate on ends in a manner that exposes rather than sup-
presses their underlying values.  Expert risk analysts and trained fa-
cilitators then join the discussion to help the stakeholders identify 
courses of action that reconcile various values and evaluate the costs 
(fiscal and environmental) of those options.114  Gregory presents em-
pirical evidence showing that this approach generates outcomes that 
are more consensual and more defensible from a scientific standpoint 
than either unguided bottom-up approaches to regulation or highly 
centralized and insulated top-down ones.115 
Structured, value-focused deliberation of this sort is likely to en-
gage all of the cultural cognition “debiasing” mechanisms we have 
identified.  Having been candidly exposed to the values of their fellow 
citizens, participating individuals are likely to form a more realistic 
and less antagonistic picture of how positions are distributed among 
their neighbors.  Armed with expert information and assisted by me-
diators, they are likely to engage in more sophisticated appraisals of 
the costs and benefits of the regulatory options available.  And because 
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the matter is being resolved not by remote agencies or administrators, 
but by them in a context in which experts engage them face-to-face, 
participants are likely to form trust-inducing emotional bonds that free 
them from the need to rely entirely on cultural affinities in assessing 
the credibility of information sources. 
Indeed, the generation of culture-independent forms of trust, par-
ticularly between lay persons and risk experts, may be the most valu-
able feature of genuinely democratic policymaking.  The design and 
implementation of policies for managing toxic waste disposal, nuclear 
power generation, and other societal risks inevitably demand substan-
tial reliance on remote expert regulators.  Because members of the 
public know that their fate is in the experts’ hands, risk experts can 
count on enduring political support for their decisions only if members 
of the public trust them.  And one of the most important conditions of 
such trust, research shows, is the perception that officials have con-
sulted and are responsive to affected members of the public.116 
The relationship between trust and deliberation ought to make 
even those who share Sunstein’s confidence in experts wary of grant-
ing them the political insulation he and other irrational-weigher theo-
rists advocate.  Just as consultation breeds trust in expert risk regula-
tors, the perception that such officials are remote and unaccountable 
erodes it.117  Ironically, then, the greater the degree of political insula-
tion the law affords to expert regulators, the less likely popularly re-
sponsive institutions of government are to invest those regulators with 
power to begin with or to respect their decisions as final. 
3.  Culture and Expert Cost-Benefit Analysis. — We have suggested 
that Sunstein overstates the intractability of error in public risk per-
ceptions.  But even if we are wrong, the cultural-evaluator model 
strongly critiques the antidemocratic nature of Sunstein’s program.  
Bringing the role of cultural cognition into view severely undermines 
the foundation for Sunstein’s refusal to afford normative significance 
to public risk evaluations generally.118 
As we have noted, Sunstein advocates delegating a sizeable amount 
of discretion to politically insulated risk specialists.  The basis for  
this prescription is his assumption that the differences between lay  
assessments of risk and expert ones are the product not of “rival  
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rationalities” but of simple errors on the part of the public, generated 
by myriad social psychological pathologies (p. 86).  Accordingly, even 
in a democracy, or at least in the best “deliberative” conception of one, 
such public sensibilities are entitled to no respect: “Democratic gov-
ernments should respond to people’s values, not to their blunders” (p. 
126).  Sunstein advocates expert cost-benefit analysis as the principal 
device for making the law responsive to the former (as reflected pri-
marily in markets and other forms of private behavior) and not the  
latter. 
The cultural-evaluator model suggests that this strategy borders on 
incoherence.  In the public consciousness, there is no genuine distinc-
tion between the “costs” and “benefits” of putatively dangerous activi-
ties.  Adopting the stance that best expresses their cultural values, citi-
zens invariably conclude that activities that affirm their preferred way 
of life are both beneficial and safe, and those that denigrate it are both 
worthless and dangerous.119  Moreover, unlike attitudes that reflect 
overgeneralization, disregard for small probabilities, inattention to 
base rates, and similar manifestations of bounded rationality,120 risk 
perceptions originating in cultural evaluation are not ones individuals 
are likely to disown once their errors are revealed to them.  Even if in-
dividuals could be made to see that their cultural commitments had 
biased their review of factual information about the dangers of, say, 
nuclear power, guns, or abortion, they would likely view those same 
commitments as justifying their policy preferences regardless of the 
facts. 
As a result, the idea that expert cost-benefit analysis respects citi-
zens’ “values” but not their “blunders” is fundamentally misleading.  
When expert regulators reject as irrational public assessments of the 
risks associated with putatively dangerous activities — whether nu-
clear power or handguns, drug use or toxic waste dumping — they are 
in fact overriding public values.  For just as citizens’ perceptions of the 
benefits of these activities express their worldviews, so too do their 
perceptions of the risks they pose. 
As Douglas and Wildavsky argue, public risk disputes, however 
much they are dominated by technical analyses of empirical data, are 
in essence “the product of an ongoing political debate about the ideal 
society.”121  Experts might have a more accurate sense of the  
magnitude of various risks (although their conclusions, too, are hardly  
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immune from cultural partisanship122), but they have no special com-
petence to identify what vision of society — hierarchical or egalitarian, 
individualistic or solidaristic — the law should endorse.  That should 
be a matter of public deliberation. 
Or at least that is the conclusion likely to be reached by anyone 
who genuinely favors democratic deliberation.  Sunstein doesn’t.  His 
is not a program for those who want to reconcile democracy with a ra-
tional response to public fears; it is a program for those who fear de-
mocracy and seek to exclude the regulation of risk from its ambit. 
IV.  CULTURE, FEAR, AND LIBERALISM 
But the hard question for anyone who accepts the cultural-
evaluator model as a descriptive matter is whether Sunstein’s fear of 
democracy might indeed be warranted.  The cultural-evaluator model, 
precisely because it exposes the clash of cultural visions that inevitably 
animates public risk disputes, reveals the potentially deep tension be-
tween democratically responsive risk regulation and liberalism. 
The rational-weigher and irrational-weigher models disagree about 
the competence of lay persons to assess the costs and benefits of vari-
ous risks.  But both accept that the optimal balance is one that maxi-
mizes satisfaction of individual preferences — or at least (in the case of 
the irrational-weigher model) the preferences individuals would have 
were they accurately to perceive the costs and benefits of putatively 
dangerous activities.  This position flows naturally from the assump-
tion that the purpose of risk regulation is to induce an efficient level of 
safety.  It also, conveniently, implements a form of liberal neutrality by 
treating all persons’ valuation of safety relative to other goals as enti-
tled to equal weight. 
But once the connection between risk perceptions and cultural 
worldviews is exposed, the justification for this ecumenical stance be-
comes less obvious.  In selecting some risks for attention and dismiss-
ing others as unimportant, individuals are, in effect, advancing their 
culturally partisan visions of the ideal society.  At least for anyone who 
accepts the liberal injunction that the law steer clear of endorsing a 
moral or cultural orthodoxy,123 it is questionable whether risk regula-
tion policy should be responsive to such demands. 
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As a practical example, consider whether hospitals should have an 
obligation under the informed consent doctrine to inform patients of 
the HIV-positive status of medical personnel.  The answer might be “of 
course” if we understand informed consent doctrine as enabling indi-
vidual patients to secure treatment consistent with their own medical 
welfare preferences.124  But the cultural-evaluator model suggests that 
the demand for such information probably is not linked to “medical 
welfare” preferences in any straightforward sense.  Our own study 
suggests that hierarchists, but not egalitarians, individualists, or solida-
rists, rate the risk of infection from an HIV-positive surgeon as a seri-
ous one.125  If what makes hierarchists attend to this risk — while 
shrugging off many more serious ones — is their preference to see the 
law reflect their contested worldview, why should the law credit that 
preference at the expense of those who hold competing worldviews 
that would be denigrated by such a position, not to mention medical 
personnel and other patients who would be adversely affected by it? 
But risk regulation sensibilities animated by the hierarchical 
worldview are hardly the only ones susceptible to these sorts of con-
cerns.  For example, one might oppose the demand for stricter forms of 
gun control on the ground that it derives not from an acceptable desire 
for personal safety, but from an illiberal desire to erect an egalitarian 
or solidaristic orthodoxy in law.126  At the same time that it extin-
guishes one ground for interfering with market and political evalua-
tions of risk — that lay sensibilities are irrational — the cultural-
evaluator model arguably creates another: that those sensibilities some-
times reflect an unjust desire to use the expressive capital of the law to 
advance culturally imperialist ends. 
Ironically, if one were convinced that illiberal cultural conflicts of 
this sort were intractable, one solution might be Sunstein’s version of 
the irrational-weigher theory.  Normative legal theories do more than 
justify particular doctrines and institutional arrangements.  They also 
furnish vocabularies that determine how citizens and legal decision-
makers talk to each other about what the law should be.  Those vo-
cabularies, by accentuating or obfuscating conflicts of value, can them-
selves influence how likely such actors are to reach agreement and 
how easily they’ll be able to get along with each other if they don’t.127   
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In this respect, the irrational-weigher theory’s analytic deficiencies can 
be seen as conflict-abating discourse virtues: precisely because it ig-
nores the decisive role that cultural values play in shaping competing 
perceptions of risk, that theory mutes the function that risk regulation 
plays in adjudicating between competing worldviews.  So defended, 
the irrational-weigher theory implements in the risk regulation field 
Sunstein’s preference for “incompletely theorized agreements” — his 
distinctive strategy for conforming the law to the liberal injunction to 
avoid endorsement of partisan visions of the good.128 
Still, this is a defense of Sunstein’s program that demurs to, rather 
than acquits it of, the charge that it is fundamentally antidemocratic.  
A genuinely democratic response to the liberal dilemma implicit in risk 
regulation might be possible, too.  Deliberation with a form of expres-
sively pluralistic politics might enable citizens of diverse worldviews to 
agree on risk without having to assent to law that denigrates anyone’s 
cultural identity.129 
The prospects for such a program, particularly on a national level, 
are admittedly uncertain.  But we are certain that if there is a democ-
ratic solution to the liberal dilemma inherent in risk regulation, it can 
be formulated only on the basis of the knowledge that the cultural-
evaluator model furnishes. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Laws of Fear is a masterful work.  No book so comprehensively 
and imaginatively synthesizes and extends existing empirical works on 
risk perception.  None more systematically develops these insights into 
a program for guiding risk regulation. 
Nevertheless, Laws of Fear’s inattention to the impact of cultural 
worldviews constrains both the descriptive and normative power of 
Sunstein’s irrational-weigher model of risk perception.  A growing 
body of research demonstrates that conflicts in perceptions of risk — 
not only between lay persons and experts but also among the members 
of both groups — reflect individuals’ adherence to competing visions 
of how society should be organized.  The cultural-evaluator model of 
risk perceptions supported by this research furnishes a much more 
complete account of why risk regulation is a matter of such deep and 
intense conflict.  It also undermines both the defense Sunstein offers 
for delegating significant risk-regulatory responsibilities to politically 
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insulated experts and his claim that such a regime is “deliberatively 
democratic.” 
Ironically, though, the inattention of Sunstein’s account to culture 
might itself be viewed by some as a strength.  The cultural-evaluator 
model of risk perception ruthlessly exposes the inescapable role that 
risk regulation plays in adjudicating disputes between competing cul-
tural groups over whose worldview the law will proclaim orthodox.  
Sunstein’s irrational-weigher account strategically obscures this func-
tion and thus offers one possible technique for countering the inher-
ently illiberal tendency of regulatory law. 
The challenge that risk regulation poses to democracy is more pro-
found than it appears not only upon first inspection but upon second 
inspection as well.  The material well-being of a democratic society 
depends on its ability to rationally manage a nearly limitless variety of 
often competing risks.  The integrity of such a society’s commitment to 
self-governance depends on its ability to fashion procedures that are 
genuinely deliberative, open, and democratic.  And its obligation to 
reconcile popular rule with respect for individual dignity and freedom 
requires it to find a mode of regulation and a strategy of regulatory 
discourse that deflect the ambitions of competing cultural groups to 
claim the law as theirs and theirs alone. 
No account that unqualifiedly celebrates the culturally expressive 
nature of risk perceptions and risk regulation can hope to achieve all 
of these critical ends.  But none that ignores the impact of culture on 
risk perceptions can hope to achieve them either. 
